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Abstract
The ubiquitous use of Internet of Things (IoT) ranges from industrial control systems to e-Health, e-commerce,
smart cities, agriculture, supply chain management, smart cars, cyber-physical systems and a lot more.
However, the data collected and processed by IoT systems especially the ones with centralized control are
vulnerable to availability, integrity, and privacy threats. Hence, we present “PrivySharing,” a blockchain-
based innovative framework for privacy-preserving and secure IoT data sharing in a smart city environment.
The proposed scheme is distinct from existing strategies on many aspects. The data privacy is preserved
by dividing the blockchain network into various channels, where every channel comprises a finite number of
authorized organizations and processes a specific type of data such as health, smart car, smart energy or
financial details. Moreover, access to users' data within a channel is controlled by embedding access control
rules in the smart contracts. In addition, data within a channel is further isolated and secured by using
private data collection and encryption respectively. Likewise, the REST API that enables clients to interact
with the blockchain network has dual security in the form of an API Key and OAuth 2.0. The proposed
solution conforms to some of the significant requirements outlined in the European Union General Data
Protection Regulation. We also present a system of reward in the form of a digital token named “PrivyCoin”
for users sharing their data with stakeholders/third parties. Lastly, the experimental outcomes advocate that
a multi-channel blockchain scales well as compared to a single-channel blockchain system.
Keywords: Internet of Things, Smart City, Security and Privacy, Blockchain, EU GDPR Compliance.
1. Introduction
There has been an exponential growth in the IoT-based services in the world, especially in telehealth,
manufacturing and in urban areas to form smart cities. IoT is expected to connect 30 billion devices by
2020 [1]. Use of IoT technologies will not only improve the quality of life of people but also contribute to
the world economy. IoT is predicted to create about USD 7.1 trillion contributions to the global economy5
by 2020 [1]. Concurrently, it is also estimated that by 2030 the global urban population will reach 5 billion.
This rapid urbanization demands effective, and optimum use of city resources as well as smart governance
and efficient service delivery [2, 3]. It is believed that the solution to the rapid urbanization problems lies in
creating a smart city that utilizes IoT technologies to monitor the physical world in real-time and provide
intelligent services. These services may include eToll, smart parking [3], smart health (remote patient moni-10
toring, health emergency response), and police assistance (for law and order situations, e.g., riots, crime, or
security breaches) [2]. However, at the same time, IoT devices are vulnerable to a vast number of security
and privacy attacks [4]. Although, these threats are known to the manufacturers, unfortunately security in
IoT devices is either neglected (due to cost or lack of expertise) or treated as an afterthought [5]. Similarly,
a smart city network also suffers from numerous security and privacy issues [2, 6], such as threats to privacy,15
integrity, and availability of user data, false data injection [3], vulnerability to Sybil Attack [7], and single
point of failure due to centralized control.
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Figure 1: Issues in the smart city environment
If we look at Figure-1, the user data collected by numerous sensors is stored and processed by various
OSN (Online Social Networks), smart city control center or various other smart city components such as In-
telligent Transportation Systems (ITS), health emergency response, fire and rescue, etc., These components20
(with mostly centralized control) process user data for the provision of various services to the users and third
parties. Although such a centralized control may look effective from the outside, yet it has some significant
security concerns.
Centralized control is subject to a single point of failure in case of a cyber-attack or other technical
malfunctions [8]. Moreover, it also has trust issues, as the users have to put their trust in the entity that25
is handling their data. Hence, users have no control over their data assets. Further concerns for user data
include: Users do not know where their data is stored and what is happening to it. Who has access to it,
and is there any unauthorized disclosure to the third parties. The above-mentioned users' concerns are very
much real as the disclosure of personal data leakage concerning millions of users by Facebook Inc. [9, 10] and
a bug in Google Plus [11] that resulted in the exposure of personal information of approx 500,000 users is a30
candid example of one of cloud/OSN vulnerabilities.
Moreover, any smart city application is believed to store, process and analyze users' data. Hence, ev-
ery security solution developed for a smart city environment must comply with the undermentioned key
requirements of European Union General Data Protection Regulation (EU GDPR) [12] while handling users'
data:35
 Personal data should be processed only with the consent of the data owner.
 Any technology dependent on user data must preserve user privacy by design.
 The gathering, processing or use of personal data should be in accordance with the instructions based
on a mutual contract between the user and the third parties.
 The owner of data has the right to access the information concerning the processing of his data, i.e.,40
which third parties have access to what data and how they use it.
 It is the right of the data owners that their data be erased immediately once it is no longer needed.
 The system should be transparent such that individuals know about the collection and use of their
data.
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As far as IoT security is concerned, researchers and security analysts are trying to leverage cryptographic45
security benefits of blockchain to resolve security and privacy issues of IoT. Hence, we believe that a care-
fully selected blockchain technology with an insightful business network design can resolve most of the data
integrity and privacy issues of a smart city.
1.1. Related Work
Security researchers around the world are developing and investigating ingenious ways to implement50
blockchain in the IoT environment. These use cases aim to take advantage of the inherent benefits of the
blockchain such as decentralized control, immutability, cryptographic security, fault tolerance, and capability
to run smart contracts. Recently, researchers [13] presented a blockchain-based data sharing framework for a
smart city environment. The framework called “SpeedyChain” focuses on reducing the TX settlement time
for real-time applications such as smart cars and also aims to ensure user privacy. Moreover, it ensures data55
integrity, tamper-resistance, and non-repudiation that are some of the intrinsic benefits of the blockchain. In
another work, Pradip Kumar and Jong Hyuk proposed a Software Defined Networking (SDN) and blockchain-
based hybrid network architecture for a smart city [14]. The proposed architecture addresses usual smart
city issues including high TX latency, security and privacy, bandwidth bottlenecks, and requirement of high
computational resources. In the proposed model the smart city network is divided into a distributed core60
network comprising resourceful miner nodes and the centralized edge network constituting inept devices. The
edge nodes store access policies for locally registered nodes. Authors claim that in addition to reducing TX
latency, and reduced network bandwidth, the proposed model limits the effects of a node compromise to the
local area.
Additionally, authors in [15] proposed a smart contract based sharing economy services in a smart city.65
The proposed model uses Artificial Intelligence (AI) for data analytics and also uses blockchain to store the
results. Similarly, Biswas and Muthukkumarasamy [16] presented an overview of a blockchain-based security
framework for secure communication between smart city entities. Authors claim that the integration of the
blockchain with devices in the smart city will provide a shared platform where all the devices would be able
to communicate securely. However, the researchers did not disclose some necessary details about the type70
of blockchain platform, consensus protocol, and TX/block validation techniques adopted in the smart city
application.
In another endeavor [17, 18], security researchers have proposed solutions to address various user pri-
vacy issues in ITS. Nonetheless, they do not cater to the challenges of smart cities such as trustless data
sharing among multiple organizations. Similarly, Ali Dorri and Raja Jurdak proposed a secure, private75
and lightweight architecture of a blockchain-based smart home application [19, 20]. It aims to solve certain
blockchain issues such as computational intensiveness, latency in TX confirmation and energy consumption.
To reduce computational overhead, and energy consumption each block is mined without any Proof of Work
(PoW). Moreover, the latency in TX confirmation is reduced by considering a TX true, whether it is mined
in a block or not. In addition, the proposed scheme utilizes cloud storage to ease up the memory require-80
ments for smart home devices. However, there are many security concerns that need further explanation with
logical reasoning [21]. Likewise, another team of researchers proposed an Ethereum Blockchain [22] based
mechanism to manage IoT devices [23]. Nonetheless, Ethereum Blockchain does not provide data privacy.
In another work, to avoid issues concerning the single point of failure in a centralized system, researchers
proposed an Ethereum Blockchain based decentralized, self-managing Vehicular Ad-Hoc Network (VANET)85
with a challenge-response based authentication [24]. However, the proposed scheme does not explain the
procedure of consensus and block mining. There is also no discussion about the type of information to be
published on the blockchain and the latency in TX confirmation. Above all, Ethereum Blockchain does not
provide data privacy and confidentiality.
Correspondingly, Yu Zhang and Jiangtao Wen proposed an Ethereum Blockchain based decentralized90
electronic business model for the IoT [25]. However, the proposed solution mostly focused on the working of
the e-business model, so there is a lack of discussion on technical aspects such as block mining mechanism,
modalities of implementing blockchain on IoT devices, and the methodology of achieving data confidentiality
and privacy. Similarly, in another work [26] authors introduced a blockchain-based security framework for
IoT implementations. Nonetheless, the proposed solution focuses on data authentication and secure com-95
munication between the sensor devices and the controllers. The researchers make use of the received signal
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strength (RSSI) of the message sent by a sensor device as a parameter to ensure the randomness of data
to avoid replay and data forging attacks by a MITM (Man-in-the-Middle) attacker. Few other researchers
have also proposed a blockchain-based approach of exchanging data in the smart city between nontrusted
organizations [27]. In this regard, if a third party queries some data, e.g. a credit report concerning a user,100
then the executor node gets the input in the form of private data from the respective organization through
a local private API. The data is encrypted with an organization's private key and is decrypted once in the
executor sandbox using the organization's public key. Hence, the querying party receives only the processed
data and does not see the original data itself.
Since the GDPR legislation came in to effect on 25th May 2018, researchers have been working on various105
aspects of data protection to develop GDPR compliant data protection/processing frameworks. In this en-
deavor, [28] proposed a blockchain-based design concept for developing GDPR compliant data management
platforms. The solicited framework shares, and revoke the sharing of user data only with the consent of data
owner. Moreover, the blockchain-based framework can also endorse the service providers for being correctly
following the GDPR policies or not. As per the devised concept, only data owners and data controllers can110
create, update, and withdraw consent, and only authorized entities can process user data. The proposed
mechanism uses blockchain to handle authentication, authorization, and data access control token validation.
Whereas, the data is stored in a centralized resource server that is assumed to be a trusted party. Apart
from the resource server being a trusted party, the proposed solution does provide some security guarantees;
however, it seems to have high communication complexity. As authors also claim that due to increased mes-115
sage overhead, the proposed scheme does not support high performance and scalability since the TX latency
significantly increases and throughput decreases with the increase in the number of nodes. Similarly, [29]
recommended a conceptual architecture of a human-centric and GDPR compliant blockchain-based personal
data and identity management system (BPDIMS). The authors focus on designing a framework, which is
transparent and provides data owners the full control over the usage of their data. The researchers address120
specific issues concerning data usage, i.e., user consent, transparency of data processing, purging of user con-
sent, reward mechanism for users, data integrity, and confidentiality. However, this work is still at conceptual
stages and does not present any technical details or performance evaluation.
Similarly, Ricardo et al. proffered a blockchain-based scheme to facilitate data accountability and prove-
nance tracking [30]. Data provenance tracking is achieved by maintaining a list of references to the data125
provided to the controller. The list is updated whenever some data is sent to the data controller/service
provider. Whereas, data accountability is accomplished by specifying restrictions on data usage in smart
contracts. The restrictions are defined under the domain of a preventive mechanism, using a security policy
language recommended by SecKit (Model-based Security Toolkit). The preventive mechanism denies actions
such as allow, deny, modify, or delay the operations concerning data usage to the data controllers. The130
authors primarily discuss various design choices for the data usage contract models while considering the
provision of maximum data provenance information to the data owners in a trusted and privacy friendly-
manner. The sample contract models are evaluated based on gas consumption in Ethereum Virtual Machine
(EVM). Correspondingly, authors in [31] introduced a consent management platform named ADvoCATE
for IoT data processing. ADvoCATE uses Ethereum Blockchain to preserve the integrity of users’ consents135
and related updated versions. The ADvoCATE may be interpreted as a cloud service platform with various
components such as blockchain, intelligent policy analyzer, consent notary, and storage. The consents notary
ensures that the created consents are up to date and are also protected against unauthorized modification.
Whereas, the intelligence component makes use of Fuzzy Cognitive Maps (FCM) methodology to identify any
rules/policies that contradict with GDPR requirements concerning the handling of users’ data. Moreover,140
whenever an IoT device is installed, the user gives his consent to the data controller/service provider through
a smart contract to access IoT device data. The digital consents duly signed by the data controller and the
device owner are stored on the ADvoCATE platform, whereas, the blockchain stores only the hashes of these
consents for integrity. However, the proposed platform is still in the development phase and has not been
extensively tested or evaluated. The authors only highlight the gas (ether) consumption of smart contracts,145
and there is no analysis on TX latency, TX throughput, scalability, or communications overhead.
In a similar endeavor [32], Nesrine Kaaniche and Maryline Laurent, presented a blockchain-based data
usage auditing architecture that provides the data controllers with unforgeable evidence of users’ consent.
The researchers claim to provide user anonymity by letting the data owners (which are delegated PKG) create
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a distinctive public-private key pair for each smart contract they initiate to share data with a service provider150
or a data processor. Moreover, the authors used hierarchical ID-based encryption to prevent unauthorized
disclosure. The data is stored on off-blockchain storage, whereas blockchain smart contracts are used to store
the hash of data and data usage policy. Also, there is a specific smart contract between the data owner and
every other service provider or data processor. However, the architecture is not supported by any performance
evaluation, e.g., TX settlement time, block commit time, or latency. In another work, authors evaluated the155
potential use of blockchain technology to facilitate the transformation of institution-centric exchange of data
to patient-centric, and patient-driven data sharing [33]. The researchers recommend that the blockchain can
be used to provide transparency over the state of shared data, and related TXs among different stakeholders.
In that permissioned blockchains can be more productive in terms of delivering strict access control concern-
ing read-write permissions over users’ health data. Authors also believe that the blockchain provides a lower160
cost of TX verification and data integrity as compared to the traditional systems. It is also accredited that
the blockchain can also ensure the availability, swift access, and immutability of health data. Moreover, it
can also provide unique identities to all patients. However, authors foresee inevitable glitches in the use of
blockchain such as high TX volume of health records, and related massive storage requirements, security, and
privacy issues concerning user data.165
Though the research work discussed above has undoubtedly made some significant contributions towards
blockchain and IoT domain. Nevertheless, there are many open issues such as preserving data privacy in
a smart city environment, user-defined fine-grained access control, fast TX settlement, users' right to for-
get (concerning data deletion), an incentive for users to share their data, and distributed storage of user
data without centralized control. Therefore, to fill the respective research gaps, we propose “PrivySharing,”170
a blockchain-based secure and privacy-preserving data sharing framework. The proposed solution aims to
protect a smart city environment against most of the data integrity and privacy threats. The experimental
results have shown that a carefully designed blockchain solution can ensure user data privacy and integrity
in various network settings as per the wishes of the data owner. It also effectively protects against false
data injection and Sybil Attacks. Moreover, PrivySharing complies with some of the significant data security175
and privacy requirements of the European Union General Data Protection Regulation (EU GDPR). The
significant contributions of this paper are:
1. Provides protection against most of the external as well as insider attacks threatening user data integrity
and privacy in a smart city setting.
2. Compliance with some of the essential requirements of EU GDPR.180
3. A blockchain-based solution providing the “right to forget” concerning user data.
4. A scalable (concerning blockchain size), secure, and an efficient (in terms of energy consumption and
computational requirements) data sharing framework.
5. User-defined fine-grained access control to user data.
6. Providing a transparent and auditable network operation and simultaneously controlling the exposure185
of users' private data.
7. Secure client access to the blockchain network through a REST API.
8. A reward system for the users for sharing their data with the stakeholders/third parties.
1.2. Basic Terminologies
Before getting involved with the detailed architecture of PrivySharing, it is imperative to understand190
some terminologies specific to Hyperledger-Fabric:
 Smart Contract (SC). A SC is a sort of a digital contract based on certain rules between different
organizations in the form of an executable code [34]. Blockchain network uses smart contracts not only
to encapsulate information but also to automate certain aspects of business TXs. Applications invoke
a smart contract to generate TXs that are further recorded on the ledger.195
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 Chaincode. The difference between smart contracts and chaincode is that, a smart contract defines
the TX logic that updates the state of a business object contained in the world state. Whereas, a
chaincode can be termed as a technical container that may contain multiple related SCs for installation
and instantiation. When a chaincode is deployed, all smart contracts within it are made available to
the applications [34].200
 Committing Peers. Every peer node in the Hyperledger-Fabric blockchain is a committing peer.
However, a Committing Peer does not have a smart contract installed. It just validates and commits a
new block of TXs sent by the Ordering Service (ODS) to its copy of the ledger [35].
 Endorsing Peers. These are special committing peers with the capability to run the smart contracts.
They prepare, sign and endorse the responses to the TX proposals sent by the clients, in line with the205
endorsement policy of the respective channel (Ch) [35].
 Ordering Service (ODS). It is a collection of some peer nodes that arrange the new TXs in a block
and then broadcast that block to all the peers of the concerned Ch [35].
 Membership Service Provider (MSP). While Certificate Authorities (CAs) issue X.509 certificates
to the network entities, an MSP states that which CAs are accepted by the blockchain network and210
also determine that which peer nodes are members of which organization. Different MSPs can be used
to represent various organizations or multiple groups within an organization. Usually, the MSPs are
defined at the network, Ch and local/peer level.
1.3. Organization of the Paper
The rest of the paper is organized into four sections. Section-2 presents the detailed architecture, reward215
mechanism, working, and security analysis of “PrivySharing.” Experimental results, some limitations of the
proposed solution and a way forward to address these limitations are illustrated in Section-3. Finally, the
paper is concluded in Section-4, with a gist of future work.
2. PrivySharing: Blockchain-based Secure Data Sharing
By leveraging data integrity and smart contract features of the blockchain, various operations in a smart220
city environment can be securely and autonomously performed. Moreover, blockchain also protects against
the adverse effects of server hacking and falsification/modification of permissions [7]. No doubt, people in a
smart city environment feel safe while sharing their personal information only when they have the assurance
that their personal and sensitive data collected by various devices are fully protected and they have control
over it [36]. Such assurance can only be provided by none other than a prudently selected and assiduously225
designed blockchain technology.
2.1. Smart City Scenario
We assume that Alice is living in a smart city where every aspect of her life is being monitored and
controlled through numerous sensors and smart devices. The critical aspects include monitoring of key health
parameters, smart car operation and service management, smart living operation and service management230
including smart meters generating data concerning energy consumption, surveillance cameras, and intrusion
detection equipment generating security-related data and financial TXs to keep the services running. For
better understanding, we have formulated a list of numerous assets (associated with a specific type of data)
that Alice owns (as shown in Table-1). Based on these assets, Alice can easily decide about the permissions
((shown in Table-2) to be granted to the stakeholders/third-parties in relation to her data assets. Such a235
distinction among the stakeholders/third-parties further assists Alice to plan and control the access to her
data. It is also assumed that all the registered users of the smart city network, whether offline or online,
interact with each other through the PrivySharing (blockchain) APIs.
To implement the above mentioned smart city use case we have used Hyperledger-Fabric as the underlying
blockchain platform due to its effective data security and privacy preserving capabilities as compared to other240
blockchain platforms [21, 37]. Hyperledger-Fabric is a private and a permissioned blockchain that restricts
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Table 1: List of Assets
Data Types Assets
Health Data
- Health Alert (Heart rate, blood
sugar, blood alcohol, etc.)
- Full Health History
- Insurance Cover
- Health Payment Claims
- Type of Disease





- Servicing and Auto Payments
Smart Meter Data
- Line Status
- Units Consumed and Bill
- Consumption Pattern
Surveillance Data
- Equipment Status and Servicing






Figure 2: Network participants
participation in the network to the authorized parties only. The key feature that distinguishes Hyperledger-
Fabric from other blockchain technologies is that in Hyperledger the blockchain ledger consists of two distinct
but related parts, i.e., a blockchain to log the TXs and a world state (a database such as CouchDB [38], and
LevelDB [39]) to keep track of the ledger states.245
2.2. Network Architecture
As shown in Figure-2, we have designed a smart city blockchain network comprising eleven organizations
and their associated peer nodes. Keeping in view the sharing of different categories of users' data with
different stakeholders (shown in Table-2) and the requirement to ensure user data privacy and security, the
blockchain network shown in Figure-3 comprises five different data Chs. Where Ch1 is used for the sharing250
of users' health data and organization-2 (O2), O3, and O5 are its members. Similarly, Ch2 is for smart
transportation data and it comprises O3, O4, O5, and O6. Whereas Ch3 is for smart energy, Ch4 for smart
security and Ch5 handles financial data (e.g., income, expenses and taxes). A Ch provides a completely
separate communication mechanism between a set of organizations. Moreover, every Ch is independent of
the other Chs. Hence, these Chs serve to preserve the privacy of user data by securely sharing a particular255
type of data with authorized entities only. The network is initiated by organization-1 (O1), i.e., the Ministry
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Table 2: Assets, Stakeholders, and Access Rights
Assets Users / Stakeholders Access Rights
Health Data
Health Alert (blood alcohol,
blood sugar, heart rate, etc.)
- Alice - Read
- Pri (Primary) Medical Center - Read and write
- Police - Read
Health History
- Alice - Read
- Pri Medical Center - Read
- Alice and Pri Medical Center
- Modify (Requires consent of both Alice and
the medical center)
Insurance Cover
- Alice - Read
- Pri Medical Center - Read
- Health Insurer - Read
- Alice and Health Insurer
- Modify (Requires consent of both, Alice and
the insurer)
Health Payment Claims
- Alice - Read and write
- Pri Medical Center - Read
- Health Insurer - Read
Type of Disease
- Alice - Read
- Pri Medical Center - Read and write
- Health Insurer - Read
- Ministry of Health - Read
Current Disease History
- Alice - Read
- Pri Medical Center - Read
- 2nd Medical Center - Read
Smart Car Data
GPS Data
- Alice - Read
- Car Service provider - Read
- Roads/Transportation Authority (ITS) - Read
Accident Alert
- Alice - Read
- Police - Read and write
- Car Insurer - Read
Damage Assessment
- Alice - Read
- Car Insurer - Read
- Workshop - Read and write
Servicing and Auto Payments
- Alice - Read
- Smart Parking - Read and write
- Security Service Provider - Read and write
- RTA - Read and Write
Smart Meter Data
Line Status
- Alice - Read
- Lineman - Read
Units Consumed and Bill
- Alice - Read
- Finance Manager of the Service Provider - Read and write
Consumption Pattern
- Alice - Read
- Operations Manager of the Service Provider - Read
Total Energy Consumption - Ministry of Power - Read
Surveillance Data
Equipment Status and Servicing
- Alice - Read
- OEM/Service Provider - Read
Security Breach Alert
- Alice - Read
- Police - Read
CCTV Recording
- Alice - Read
- Police - Read
Total Incidents of Security - Ministry of Interior - Read
Financial Transactions
Income
- Alice - Read and write
- Bank - Read
- Revenue - Read
Expenses
- Alice - Read and write
- Bank - Read
Tax
- Alice - Read
- Bank - Read
- Revenue - Read and write
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Figure 3: Smart city blockchain-network architecture
of Development and Smart Services and is governed by the policy rules specified in the network configuration
(NC). NC also controls access to the smart city network. Later, O1 updates NC and gives administrative
(admin) rights to O2, O3, and O4 as well. These organizations can now create consortia and Chs to add
more network members. Similarly, every Ch is regulated by the policy rules specified in the respective Chan-260
nel Configuration (CC). In this setting, Ch1 is under the control of O2 and O5 and is governed by CC1.
Correspondingly, Ch2 is regulated by CC2, and so on.
The CC is essential for Ch security, e.g., if the client application (clientApp) wants to access a SC on P1,
then P1 consults its copy of CC1 to determine the operations that clientApp can perform. Moreover, there
is a separate ledger for every Ch, and all the peer nodes have to maintain a copy of the ledger concerning265
every Ch they are a member of. Therefore, if a peer, say P4, is a member of three different Chs, then it
has to maintain three ledgers. Data in a Ch is isolated from the rest of the network including other Chs.
Another important aspect of smart city blockchain network is the ODS, which is common to all the Chs. In
this setup, the ODS has four ordering nodes, one each from O1, O2, O3, and O4. Each node in the ODS
keeps a record of every Ch created through NC. Regarding CAs, every organization in the network can have270
its own CA. But there is one Root CA (RCA) in the network to establish the root of trust. As a Proof of
Concept (PoC) for PrivySharing, we are using Hyperledger-Fabric RCA to issue X.509 certificates to all the
network entities. These certificates serve to authenticate the network entities and to digitally sign the client
application TX proposals and smart contract TX responses. A user accesses the network through a clientApp
with a specific X.509 ID, using a SC. It is imperative to mention that only the endorsing peers can see the275
SC logic as they have to run the users' TX proposals to prepare the responses.
To ensure the privacy of critical user data within a Ch, i.e., keeping part of user data private from some
organizations within a Ch, we adopted a methodology of “Private Data Collection,” in which the critical
private data is sent directly to the authorized organizations/stakeholders only. This data is stored in a pri-
vate database (a.k.a sideDB) on the authorized nodes. While private information is stored on the authorized280
nodes, only the hash of this data is processed, i.e., endorsed, ordered, and written to the ledgers of every
peer on the Ch. The hash of the data serves as evidence of the TX, and it also helps in the validation of
the world state. A vital data security feature here is that the ordering nodes do not see the private data.
However, to further increase the level of data privacy/confidentiality, the user has the option to encrypt his
private data such that not even the peers/nodes authorized to view data stored in the private data collection285
can see the original contents. The data is encrypted using AES-256 bit symmetric encryption key and then
stored in the private data collection. Later on, only the authorized users who have access to the decryption
key can query the user's private data. Supplementary to the data encryption, there is an additional feature
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Figure 4: Smart Contract TXs
of signed encryption of private data for an increased level of user authentication and data security.
Another important feature of our proposed network architecture is the use of Membership Service Provider290
(MSP) at various levels such as network, Ch and local/peer. The network MSP (NMSP) defines, who all
are the members of the network and who out of them have the admin rights. Additionally, an NMSP also
defines that which RCAs/CAs are trusted. On the other hand, the Ch MSPs (CMSP) outline admin and
participatory rights at the Ch level. All the peers and the ODS share a common CMSP to correctly authen-
ticate and verify the authorizations of the Ch members. A use case for the CMSP is that, e.g., an admin295
of an organization wants to instantiate a SC on Ch1, then by looking at the CMSP, the other Ch members
can verify that whether that admin is a part of a specific organization or not and whether he is authorized
to instantiate the SC on Ch1 or not.
Similarly, a local MSP (LMSP) is defined for every client-node/peer. The LMSP associates a peer with
its organization. It also defines the permissions for that peer and allows it to authenticate itself in its TXs on300
the Ch. Here a question may arise that, what is the difference between CC and a CMSP. A CC contains the
policies that govern that Ch, i.e., which organizations can regulate the Ch and add new members. Whereas,
a CMSP establishes the linkage between the nodes and their respective organizations, and what roles a node
can play within a Ch, i.e., can it instantiate a SC on a Ch? Concerning decentralization aspect; the use
of a dedicated trusted CA, a blockchain admin, and a business network admin by every organization in the305
blockchain network provides some degree of decentralization as compared to all the admin rights resting with
a single organization.
Another question may arise that what advantages do we get by using multiple Chs for different data
types as compared to a single Ch blockchain network to share all the types of data. There are two aspects
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to this selection; one is scalability, and second is increased privacy of user data. From the scalability point of310
view, if there is only one Ch for all types of data, then it means that the users will have to store the ledger
comprising all those TXs that are not even related to them. Hence, the ledger size will increase rapidly,
thus putting more strain on storage resources of all the users/peers. Whereas, in the case of “PrivySharing”,
the users will maintain a ledger that stores only that data which concerns all the users of that particular
Ch. Moreover, the experimental results (Section-3) have validated that the multi-Ch blockchain network315
scales well as compared to a single-Ch blockchain. As far as the privacy of user data is concerned, a data
specific Ch shared only by some of the stakeholders provides more privacy than a single Ch comprising all
the stakeholders sharing multiple data types. Although, use of multiple data specific Chs seems scalable as
compared to a single Ch, yet the requirement for users to maintain a ledger each for every Ch, in which they
participate, may still crave for ample storage resources.320
PrivySharing framework has been designed, developed, and tested based on the agile blockchain applica-
tion development guidelines proposed by [40]. The said guidelines helped in a systematic design, development,
and testing of PrivySharing network architecture, SC functionality, and efficacy of ACL rules. Moreover, in-
fluenced by these guidelines, Figure-4 highlights different TXs initiated by various actors operating in the
smart city network. Every TX and its associated decision/response based on ACL rules are depicted by the325
same colored line. E.g., a client/third party can only query for some user data asset. If it is authorized
to access the data, the query will be successful. Otherwise, there will be an access denied error message.
Both the query and respective response are shown by blue lines. Similarly, the data share TX is sketched
in green color. As per PrivySharing business model the client/third party should not be allowed to submit
a data sharing TX, hence, if a client still initiates a TX to share data asset of some user, then he gets a330
“access denied: not enough permissions” error message. TXs concerning data owner and stakeholder are also
projected accordingly.
2.3. Smart City Blockchain - Plain TX Flow
There are two types of TXs; one is plain TX that can be viewed by all the Ch members and the other one
is private data TX that is to be shared only with some selected peers in a Ch. In this regard, e.g., a plain TX335
that is required to update Alice's car's current location state on Ch2 is initiated by the ClientAppA installed
in Alice's smart car. This TX (as shown in Figure-5a) is processed in the following steps:
Step-1. ClientAppA invokes the SCA and sends a TX proposal containing the current location of Alice's
car to the pre-defined endorsers as per SCA endorsement policy on Ch2. In this case, the endorsers are E2a
(RTA), E2b (Police) and E2c (Car Service Provider). A TX will be approved if it is endorsed by a minimum340
two out of the three prescribed endorsers.
Step-2
2.1. Three endorsers E2a, E2b, and E2c, invoke SCA with the proposal.
2.2. SCA generates a query or update proposal response. The endorsers, E2a and E2b endorse the proposal
for correctness.345
Step-3. E2a and E2b both send a signed (endorsed) TX proposal response along with RW (read, write) set
back to the ClientAppA. At this stage, the endorsing peers do not apply the proposed update to their copy
of the ledger.
Step-4. ClientAppA verifies that the response received from at least two endorsers is the same, i.e., de-
terministic. However, there is a possibility that the results were generated at different times on different350
peers with ledgers at different states. Hence, the peers can return different TX responses for the same TX
proposal. In this case, an application can simply request a more up-to-date proposal response. Another less
likely possibility is that the SC might be non-deterministic, e.g., while getting forex (foreign exchange rates)
data from some websites, the TX responses can be different, as forex rates may differ at different times.
Therefore, inconsistent results cannot be accepted by the application and applied to the ledger.355
Step-5. Once the ClientAppA verifies the endorsers' responses, it sends the TX to the ODS.
Step-6. ODS then groups the received TXs in a block. The sequence of TXs in a block is not necessarily the
same as the order of arrival of the TXs at the orderers. However, the generated blocks are final, and there
are no forks. Moreover, the orderers do not host the ledger and the SCs, and they are also not concerned
about the value of the TX rather they just package the TXs into the blocks.360
Step-7. ODS Broadcasts the next proposed block to all the peers on the Ch2.
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Figure 5: a) Plain TX flow, and b) Private data TX flow
Step-8. All the committing peers validate each and every TX in a block (in the same sequence as they
appear in the block) to ensure that it is correctly endorsed by all the required endorsers before it is applied
to the ledger. Once a TX is verified correctly, the peers perform a ledger consistency check to establish that
the current state of the ledger is compatible with the state of the ledger when the proposed update was365
generated. World state is updated based on the validated TXs. It is to be noted that, the failed TXs are not
applied to the ledger, but they are retained for audit purpose. Moreover, TX validation in Step-8 does not
require running of SCs. This is done only by the endorsers. Hence, SCs are installed only on the endorsers.
This keeps the logic of the SCs confidential to the endorsing organizations only. Moreover, peers also mark
each TX in each block as valid or invalid. Finally, a new block is appended to the hash chain stored in the370
ledger L2, maintained by all the peers in their file system.
Step-9. Ledger update event is generated, and the ClientAppA is notified.
It is important to note that prior to appending a block, a version check is performed to ensure that the
states being updated are the same that were read during SC execution. It protects against double spending
and other data integrity threats. The above mentioned TX workflow mediated by the orderers is called375
“Consensus”, as all the peers reach on an agreement about the content and the order of the TXs.
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Figure 6: Reward mechanism based on PrivyCoins
2.4. Smart City Blockchain - Private Data TX Flow
As per smart city network settings shown in Figure-3, if a wearable blood alcohol monitoring device on
Alice generates an alert to be seen only by her primary medical center and the local police for immediate
response. In such a case, it is required to keep such a TX private which should not be seen by other members380
on Ch1 except P2, P4, and P5. Such a private data TX (as shown in Figure-5b) is processed in the following
steps:
Step-1. The clientAppB submits a proposal request to invoke a SC function (RW private data) to the
endorsing peers E1b (Primary Medical Center) and E1c (Police), which are part of the authorized organiza-
tions of the collection (defined by the private data dissemination policy on health alert). The private data385
concerning health alert on blood alcohol level is sent in a transient field of the proposal.
Step-2. E1b and E1c simulate the TX and store the private data in a transient data store (temporary
storage local to them). The endorsing nodes also distribute the private data based on the collection policy
to authorized peers via gossip. But in this case, we only have three peers, i.e., P2(E1b), P4(E1c) and P5.
Step-3. E1b and E1c send the proposal response back to the clientAppB with public data, including a hash390
of the private data key and value (Blood alcohol level). No private data is sent back to the clientAppB in
plaintext.
Step-4. The clientAppB verifies that the RW sets received from E1b and E1c are same.
Step-5. The clientAppB submits the TX with a hash of the private data to the ODS.
Step-6. The ODS packs the TX in the latest block. The block with the hashed value is distributed to all395
the peers on Ch1.
Step-7. All the peers on the channel validate TX with the hash of the private data in a consistent way,
without knowing the actual private data.
Step-8. Ledger update event is generated, and the clientAppB is notified.
2.5. Reward Mechanism400
PrivySharing incentivizes the users to share their data with other users, stakeholders, or third parties by
rewarding them with a local digital token named “PrivyCoin”, as exhibited in Figure-6. PrivyCoin is just
like an asset in the smart city network that is issued only by the network admin (Ministry of Development
and Smart Services) against the payment in terms of fiat currency. The secure execution of such a TX is
not covered in this paper. However, it is envisaged that the stakeholders can pay the ministry through any405
secure payment app and then receive the coins in their wallet, just like any other cryptocurrency/token.
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PrivyCoin is primarily used for trading or getting access to the data assets. After acquiring PrivyCoins, the
stakeholder forwards the request for data access along with asset ID and the duration of access (in terms of
days). Currently, in PrivySharing, the third parties/stakeholders pay one PrivyCoin to a user to get access
to a data asset for one day (24 hours). Hence, if a stakeholder wants to get access to two data assets of a410
user for five days, he has to pay ten PrivyCoins to the user. Upon receiving the request to share data, it is
only the prerogative of the data owner to initiate the data sharing TX. The data owner gets the incentive as
soon as the data sharing TX is committed. In this context, if a stakeholder does not have requisite coins in
his account, the TX will fail (shown in Figure-7). The pseudocode for the reward-based data sharing TX is
illustrated in Algorithm-1. This algorithm can be summarized into four steps. Firstly, the data asset to be415
shared is obtained from the asset registry. Whereas, the input data structure of the data sharing TX contains
the asset type (e.g., Heart Rate, Blood Sugar, etc.), the asset reference (ID of the asset), the time duration
of sharing (e.g., three days) and a list of stakeholders (e.g., P2, P4). Then, the algorithm checks whether the
asset has already been shared with the stakeholders or not. After that, stakeholders pay PrivyCoins to the
data owner. Finally, the asset status is updated, and an event is emitted to notify the related parties, i.e.,420
user and the stakeholders.
Algorithm 1 Reward-based Data Sharing with the Stakeholders.
Input: ShareWithStakeholder(tx)
asset← assetRegistry.get(tx.assetReference){STEP-1: Retrieving the asset from asset registry}
{STEP-2: Check, whether an asset is already shared with the stakeholder or not}
for all stakeholder In tx.stakeholders do
if asset.stakeholdersWithAccess is not Empty then
stakeholderId← stakeholder.operatorId
if stakeholderId exists in asset.stakeholdersWithAccess then
MESSAGE: Data already shared.
Jump to the next stakeholder
else





{STEP-3: Stakeholders pay coins to the asset owner}
coins← Coinsbelongtostakeholder
if coins.length < tx.days then
return ERROR: stakeholder does not have enough coins
else











The security, being the core objective of this work has been assessed at every level of the network opera-
tion. The key aspects shown in Figure-8 are illustrated as under.
When the blockchain network is first created, all the peers and orderer organizations are issued with425
certificates from respective RCA, or other trusted CAs. Then, a connection profile is created for all the net-
work entities including Chs, ODS, organizations, peers, and CAs. The connection profile defines the complete
blockchain network setup. E.g., for a Ch, it defines the Ch name, its associated ODS and peers. It also defines
which peers are the endorsing peers for that particular Ch. For an organization, it defines the namespace,
MSP ID, member peers, and the respective CA. The peers' profile includes the namespace, URL including430
the port number, and the Transport Layer Security (TLS) certificate for its principal organization. The key
point here is that no other peer (with the intention of endorsing the TXs on a Ch) can join the network if it
is not defined in the connection profile. It is clarified that by peers, we mean committing, endorsing or ODS
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Figure 7: Error for not having enough coins
Figure 8: Elements of PrivySharing network security
peer nodes that maintain the blockchain network. Whereas, the users/clients access the blockchain network
through REST API or clientApps. The smart city blockchain network entities including ODS, peers, CAs,435
ledgers, and SCs run in separate docker containers (symbolize by blue boxes numbered from D1 to D15 in
Figure-8. This separation minimizes the effects of a container compromise, i.e., if one container's security is
breached the other containers remain unaffected.
To deploy the business network model (PrivySharing in this case) that comprises asset definitions, TX
and event logic, and ACL rules on the blockchain, the admin of responsible organization (O1 in this scenario)440
requires a Business Network Card (BNC). The BNC is created using the connection profile of the organi-
zation and the valid public and private key for that admin issued by the authorized CA, as defined in the
connection profile. The TXs initiated by the clientApps on a specific Ch are endorsed as per the endorsement
15
policy defined for the respective Ch before the start of the business network. The endorsement policy may
include, e.g., what all peers (with endorsing ability) are required to endorse a TX on a Ch concerning health445
data. Similarly, a TX is considered valid, only if the response of all the required endorsing peers is the same.
Hence, only a valid TX will update the world state. Another vital security feature of PrivySharing is that
before the start of the business network on the blockchain, business network admins have to be defined and
issued with the certificates (Public and Private key pairs) by the respective CAs. These certificates are later
used to create the BNCs for the said admins to access the business network. Without a valid BNC, no one450
can add participants (clients/peers) for an organization. Moreover, every new client/peer added under an
organization is also issued with an ID by the respective CA with the approval of the business network admin.
These IDs are further used to control access to the users' profile and assets as per the ACL rules defined for
the specific Ch.
As far as privacy of user data is concerned, the use of data specific Chs, private data collection, and data455
encryption does provide some degree of data privacy. However, even if a user's IoT device data is encrypted,
still a passive network attacker can infer a pattern of user's activities. The same has been demonstrated by
the researchers in [41]. The authors exhibited that an adversary capable of monitoring the network traffic
between a smart home gateway device and the internet can determine the type of IoT devices being used
inside a smart home, based on DNS queries. Also, the attacker can analyze the metadata of the network460
traffic and observe variations in the IoT data send/receive rates. Hence, based on these abrupt changes
in data rate/packet size, the adversary can deduce vital information about user's behavior and daily rou-
tine. Although, the conventional IoT classification methods do not apply to the blockchain, as the TXs in
blockchain contain public keys instead of IP addresses, and are broadcast to the network. Nevertheless, to
avert the effects of malicious network traffic monitoring measures such as incorporation of VPN tunneling465
or obfuscating and shaping all smart home network traffic can be taken to mask variations that encode real-
world behavior of the device owner.
Correspondingly, in blockchain-based IoT systems, the combination of device classification and user
deanonymization can infer private information about a user to an adversary. Although, in PrivySharing,
the IDs of all the members of the network are known and there is also a provision that each user can be470
issued with multiple cryptographic IDs (Public-Private key pairs) [42]. Hence, users can use a different ID
to communicate with every stakeholder. Such an arrangement seems robust against linking attacks [43].
However, blockchain researchers in [44] established the possibility of IoT devices classification by analyzing
IoT device data stored on the blockchain by applying Machine Learning (ML) algorithms. Unlike in [41], an
adversary is assumed to have access only to the data stored on the blockchain rather than the network traffic475
[44]. The attack methodology identifies the IoT devices based on different patterns of timestamp differences
in successive TXs of each type of device. However, researchers also proposed combinations of various meth-
ods of timestamp obfuscation to avoid device classification. These techniques include: introducing a random
delay in the TXs of a device, combining multiple data packets of a specific device into a single TX, and lastly,
merging ledgers of numerous devices.480
3.1. ACL Rules
PrivySharing has embedded user-defined ACL rules in the data sharing chaincodes to protect user data.
The graphical illustration of the access control process based on some of the ACL rules is shown in Figure-9.
These rules enforce that the data asset owners have access to their assets only, i.e., no user can see data
assets of any other user, and only the data owners can initiate a TX to share their data assets with other485
users/stakeholders. Similarly, a data owner has the right to revoke the sharing of his assets, and he can
also delete his assets when no longer required without affecting the TX history stored on the blockchain.
Moreover, as all the TXs are recorded on the blockchain, hence, to increase privacy, a data owner can see
the TX history concerning his own assets only. Additionally, valid users can read and update their profiles
only, and other users/stakeholders cannot see each other's profile. Users can also delegate the stakeholders490
to create assets on their behalf. E.g., Alice (P5) delegates her primary medical center (P2) to create a health
data asset for her. Accordingly, the stakeholders can only see the data assets that are shared with them or
created by them. Lastly, all the users/stakeholders can view their coins only. The pseudocode of the data
asset unsharing and asset deletion is accordingly shown as Algorithm-2, and Algorithm-3, respectively.
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Figure 9: ACL rules
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Algorithm 2 Unsharing Data Assets with the Stakeholders
Input: UnshareWithStakeholder(tx)
asset← assetRegistry.get(tx.assetReference){COMMENT: Retrieving the asset from asset registry}
{COMMENT: Removing the stakeholders}
for all stakeholder In tx.stakeholders do
if asset.stakeholdersWithAccess is not Empty then
stakeholderId← stakeholder.operatorId
if stakeholderId exists in asset.stakeholdersWithAccess then
Remove stakeholder from asset.stakeholdersWithAccess
else
MESSAGE: Asset is not shared with the stakeholder
end if
else
MESSAGE: Stakeholder has no access to any record.
end if
{COMMENT: Emitting an event of unsharing asset}




Algorithm 3 Deleting a Data Asset
Input: DeleteAsset(tx)
asset← assetRegistry.get(tx.assetReference){COMMENT: Retrieving the asset from asset registry}
{COMMENT: Removing the asset from asset registry}
Delete asset
{COMMENT: Emitting an event of Deleting}
Emit event of asset deletion
return Deleting Success
3.2. Security of REST API and Dapp495
Access to the REST API is secured using the API key which is required to launch the REST API.
In addition to the API Key, OAuth-2.0 authorization protocol [45] is also employed to authorize access
to PrivySharing REST server instance, and allow the end-users/clients to interact with the PrivySharing
business network deployed on the blockchain. The mechanism of OAuth-based REST API security protocol
is shown in Figure-10. In step-1, the client/user/third-party App sends an authorization request to the500
PrivySharing business network admin from O1 that also acts as the resource owner. The resource owner then
replies with the authorization grant. In step-3, the client sends an authorization token request containing the
authorization grant received from the resource owner in step-2 to the authorization server. After validating
the authorization grant, the authorization server issues an access token to the client. The client then requests
the PrivySharing REST Server to grant access by presenting the access token. Finally, in step-6, if the token505
is valid, the client is granted access to call the PrivySharing REST API operations. Currently, there are more
than three hundred options for the client REST Server authentication strategies including SAML, LDAP,
GitHub and a blend of OSN such as Facebook and Google. For this PoC, we have used Passport-GitHub
strategy to authenticate the users. The detailed procedure of enabling OAuth for PrivySharing REST Server
is depicted in Figure-11.510
Furthermore, due to the distributed nature of the SCs, the integrity of any business network deployed on
the blockchain is guaranteed. Similarly, it also protects against hacking of servers, where, the attackers can
change the policy rules, escalate access rights, etc. Correspondingly, protection against application and web
vulnerabilities can also be guaranteed with high probability, as any change in the smart contract requires
installing and instantiating a new version of the contract on all the endorsing peers. However, it cannot be515
done discretely. Additionally, due to a distinction between blockchain and the world state, an auditable log
of TXs and events is maintained without compromising the privacy of the users' data.
3.3. Restricted Access to User Data Assets via Multiple Chs
In addition to restricting access to users' data assets through ACL rules within a Ch, the use of data
specific Chs is also helpful in preserving users' data privacy. Through our PoC, we have validated that every520
Ch in PrivySharing smart city network is independent of other Chs with associated Ch members. As shown in
Figure-12, when P13 from O7 (not a member of Ch1), tries to query a user’s heartRate data, he gets an access
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Figure 10: PrivySharing REST server OAuth protocol
denied error because he is not authorized to access any data asset propagated on Ch1. As PrivySharing is a
permissioned consortium blockchain, all the network members are duly registered and authenticated before
joining the network. However, even if an unauthorized node gets added to the system through a corrupt525
network admin, the ACL rules prohibit the intruder from unauthorized access to users’ data assets.
Moreover, Table-3 shows the methodology we adopted to achieve the security objectives derived from
smart city threat environment and EU GDPR requirements. However, one of these objectives, i.e., IoT
device integrity check has not been addressed in this paper.
4. Experimental Results530
To validate the security effectiveness and measure the performance efficiency of the proposed solution, we
designed, developed and set up a three-Ch smart city data sharing scenario for the sharing of health, smart
energy, and financial data. The experimental setting, as shown in Figure-13, comprises six organizations and
twelve peers. However, for a production environment, the minimum nodes required to establish a blockchain
network primarily depends upon the type of consensus protocol being used for ordering service. Moreover,535
other contributing factors may include the type of blockchain application and the degree of decentralization
required. Hence, there may be multiple Chs, more than two organizations with their peers and CAs, and
numerous stakeholders participating in the ordering service. Currently, Kafka is the recommended consensus
protocol for the production environment. Moreover, Kafka-based ordering service is a combination of a Kafka
cluster and Zookeeper ensemble. To establish a Kafka cluster and Zookeeper ensemble, there should be a set540
of a minimum of four Kafka and three Zookeeper nodes to achieve fault tolerance. As a PoC, we deployed
the business network model of PrivySharing on Hyperledger Fabric ver 1.4 and validated various security
and performance attributes. It is also verified that access to users' data assets are effectively regulated by
numerous ACL rules. To measure key performance indicators of PrivySharing, we used Hyperledger Caliper,
a blockchain benchmark tool. The experiments were performed on a machine with Intel Core i7 2.9 GHz545
CPU, 8 GB RAM, and Ubuntu 18.04 operating system.
4.1. Validation of ACL Rules
The validity of the ACL rules was checked on both, the Hyperledger Composer-Playground and the REST
API. E.g., As shown in Figure-14a and b, to compare the access rights we have created a user with admin
rights that can view assets (blood alcohol level) of all the users, i.e., P5 and P6 in this case. Whereas, the550
user P5 with ID Pid5 can only see his assets. Moreover, Figure-14c and d show that initially, a user P4 with
id Pid4 cannot see any asset, as no asset is currently shared with him. However, once user P5 shares his
blood alcohol level with P4, he can then see P5's blood-alcohol level. Similarly, only P5 can initiate a TX
to share its assets. Whereas, if P4 tries to share the asset of P5 with any other entity then he will get an
error (as shown in Figure-15) as he currently does not have the right to initiate a data sharing TX. As far555
as the purging of a data asset is concerned, as shown in Figure-16a, a data asset say P5's blood sugar can
be deleted. However, Figure-16b manifests that the historical record (TX history) of a deleted asset remains
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Figure 11: PrivySharing REST server OAuth flowchart
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Table 3: Methodology to Achieve PrivySharing Objectives
Ser
Factors Deriving the Ob-
jectives
Objectives Methodology
Threats to User/Data Security in a Smart City Environment
1. User privacy (ID disclosure)
Reduce the possibility of users’ real world ID disclo-
sure
PKI (X.509 Certificates) based mul-
tiple IDs for users
2. User data privacy
Data confidentiality at rest and in transit, prevent over
data collection, controlled access to data as defined by
the data owner
Data encryption, use of SSL/TLS for
data security in transit, user-defined
ACL rules, use of multiple Chs and
private data collection within a Ch
3.
Single point of failure (from
physical as well as trust
point of view)
Distributed data storage and decentralized control Hyperledger-Fabric Blockchain
4. False injection of data Prevent data injection by unauthorized users
ID management, authentication and
participation of only authorized
nodes in the network. Moreover, TX
initiation rights given to data owners
or the parties given delegated powers
by the data owners
5. Vulnerability to Sybil Attack Prevent Sybil Attack
User ID management and TX initi-
ation by authorized entities only as
per ACL rules
6.
Lack of common security
framework for heterogeneous
IoT devices with different
communication protocols
and diverse hardware pa-
rameters
Provide a common platform to store data transmit-
ted/received from the heterogeneous sensors, irrespec-




Threats to data integrity
(data forgery and manipula-
tion)
Preserve user data integrity
User authentication and restricted
privileges to update user data, and
blockchain's inherent data integrity
protection
8.
Threats to smart city appli-
cations
Protect applications against the escalation of privi-
leges and alteration attacks
Use of smart contracts based DApps
10. Scalability Contain the size of the blockchain
Use of blockchain to store TX logs
only, whereas a world state is used
to store user data updated states
11.
TX Latency and Through-
put
More TX throughput with less latency
Use of multi-Ch blockchain as com-
pared to a single-Ch blockchain
Essential GDPR Requirements for User Data Security
1.
Personal data to be pro-
cessed only with data
owner's consent
The data owner is in complete control of his data,
transparency of the complete process, visibility of all
security and data access control changes
Chaincode-based user data access
control rules, maintaining, and dis-
seminating TX log on the need to
know basis (Only a data owner or an
authorized entity can see the TX log
of a specific asset) and data sharing
TX can only be initiated by the data
owner
2. Privacy by design
By default user data should be inaccessible to all, ex-
cept those who are specifically allowed by the data
owner
Access control rules deny everyone to
see other's profile and assets unless
explicitly shared by the data owner
3.
Commissioned data process-
ing (i.e., data collection and
processing as per the con-
tract between the data owner
and other parties)
A contract-based user data sharing that should con-
form to the contractual obligations
Business logic is transformed into
Smart Contracts for secure and effi-
cient data sharing as per contractual
obligations
4.
Data owner should have ac-
cess to all the information
concerning his data (i.e.,
where is it stored, who has
access to it, and for how
long)
A transparent system, where data owner has complete
visibility of the process and should be able to see and
control the access to his data
User-defined data access control, and
TX log management
5.
Right to forget, i.e., user
data to be erased when no
longer required
The system should allow user data deletion after a spe-
cific time, when the contract between the user and a
third party expires, or when data is outdated or no
longer required. Hence, there should be some distinc-
tion between TX log maintenance and user data stor-
age. Such that even if user data is deleted, we are still
able to verify the integrity of the past data
The world state is distinct from the
blockchain. Hence, data/asset owner
can delete user data from the world
state without affecting TX log his-
tory
6. Transparency
The system should be transparent, i.e., log all the ac-
tivities concerning users' data (when and who modi-
fied the access control policies for data and updated
the data itself)
TX log management and event noti-
fication
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Figure 12: Access denied for out of Ch data query
Figure 13: Experimental Settings Phase-1
immutable in the blockchain. Sequel to this, the TX history concerning the data assets can only be viewed by
respective users only. As shown in Figure-16c and d, only P5 (Alice) can view the record of her data sharing
TXs. Whereas, any other user, say P6 (Bob) cannot see Alice's TX history. However, even if a blockchain560
admin is allowed to view the transaction history of all the nodes for accountability, the admin still cannot
see the value of the data asset being shared.
4.2. Performance Efficiency
Though, a detailed comparison of performance efficiency of Hyperledger Fabric with some of its counter-
parts is already presented in [21] and [46]. However, as per the experimental settings for phase-1 (as shown in565
Figure-13), we measured the time taken to commit various types of TXs in the preview of PrivySharing. The
average commit time has been measured for three different TXs based on ten iterations. The TXs include;
plain text (PlainText) TX, private data (PvtData) TX, and encrypted private data (EncPvtData) TX. These
TXs are analyzed in two different consensus environments, i.e., SOLO and Kafka.
It is evident from Figure-17 that all types of TXs irrespective of the employment methodology take less570
than 490 (milliseconds)ms to commit in a new block. However, there is a clear pattern that the EncPvtData
TXs for both asset generation and sharing take more time to commit than the PvtData and PlainText TXs.
Moreover, the time taken by an asset sharing TX is lower than the asset generation/creation TX in almost all
three cases. Similarly, Figure-18 highlights the average (avg) time taken for state validation, block commit,
and state commit for asset generation and asset sharing TXs with SOLO and Kafka consensus both. It575
can be ascertained that the time taken for block commit (represented by rust strip) in all three cases, i.e.,
EncPvtData, PvtData, and PlainText TXs, does not show many variations. However, the state commit time
(expressed in the grey strip) significantly reduces for the PlainText TXs with SOLO and Kafka consensus in
both cases, i.e., asset generation and asset sharing TXs. Similarly, the overall TX commit time for a plain
text TX is lower than the EncPvtData and PvtData TXs.580
In the second phase of the experiment, we measured various performance indicators of PrivySharing using
Hyperledger Caliper as per the settings shown in Table-4. For the initial test, we ran thirty rounds of the
experiment for both one-Ch and three-Ch scenarios with Kafka ordering service (consensus). There were
six peers and six clients operating in the one-Ch and two peers and two clients per Ch in the three-Ch sce-
nario. Total three hundred TXs were input to the system at the rate of fifty tps (Transactions per second),585
in both scenarios. The highlight of this experiment as shown in Figure-19 is that the three Ch scenario
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Figure 14: Validation of assets access control
Table 4: Experimental Settings Phase-2
Parameters




Number of Chs 01 03
Number of Input TXs 300 300
TX Send Rate 50 tps 50 tps
Number of Member Organizations 6 6
Peers Per Ch 6 2
Total Peers 6 6
Number of Orderer Nodes
4 Kafka Nodes 4 Kafka Nodes
3 Zookeeper Nodes 3 Zookeeper Nodes
Number of Clients 6 6
Number of Experiment Rounds 30 30
has demonstrated efficient performance contrary to the single Ch scenario, with an avg throughput of 42.4
tps and avg latency of 1.54 sec at the TX Send Rate of 50 tps. After this primitive comparison, we also
determined the p-values [47, 48], for both the scenarios to substantiate our findings. In that, we first ap-
plied independent two-sample T-test on latency measurements to determine the p-value to accept or reject590
the null hypothesis, i.e., “The average latency of the one-Ch network is equal to the average latency of the
three-Ch network.” Whereas, the alternative hypothesis is; “The average latency of the one-Ch network is
greater than the average latency of the three-Ch network.” The p-value resulted from the first test on system
latency was 8.62 x 10−31, which is less than 0.05. The result suggests the rejection of the null hypothesis
in favor of the alternative hypothesis. Therefore, it is more probable that the average latency of the one-Ch595
network is higher than the average latency of the three-Ch system. Later, The second two-sample T-test
was performed over throughput values. The null hypothesis in this case was; “The average throughput of
the one-Ch network is equal to the average throughput of the three-Ch network.” Whereas, the alternative
hypothesis states that “The average throughput of the one-Ch network is less than the average throughput
of the three-Ch network.” The p-value emanated from this proceeding was 1.23 x 10−28, which is smaller600
than 0.05. Hence, the result asserts the rejection of the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative hypothesis.
Therefore, it is much likely that the average throughput of the one-Ch network is smaller than the average
throughput of the three-Ch system. Hence, based upon the p-values, it can be concluded that the one-Ch
network has inferior performance in terms of high latency and low throughput as compared to the three-Ch
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Figure 15: Validation of TX initiation rights
Figure 16: Historical record of purged data asset and visibility of TX history
network.605
In the third phase of the performance testing, we mapped the correlation between different performance
indicators for the three-Ch network. TX Send Rate was pitched against network latency and throughput, as
per the test settings shown in Table-5. The experiment was run for ten rounds with varying TX Send Rate
in each round. Although we had set specific TX Send Rate for the test case, however, the actual Send Rate
that was executed by the system came out to be different. There were two peers, and two clients in each Ch610
to process and submit the TXs, respectively. Figure-20a, interprets the relationship between TX Send Rate
and network latency. The avg latency increases uniformly until the TX Send Rate reaches around 106 tps.
After that, the latency starts fluctuating between 3 and 4 secs. Correspondingly, Figure-20b also highlights a
similar trend, in which the network throughput rises with the increase in the TX Send Rate. However, once
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Figure 17: Avg TX Commit Time
Table 5: Experimental Settings Phase-3
Parameter Settings
Number of Chs 03
Number of Input TXs 300
TX Send Rate (configured) for Ten
Rounds (tps)
25, 50, 75, 100, 125, 150, 175, 200, 225, 250
TX Send Rate (actual) for Ten Rounds
(tps)
24.4, 47.4, 70.9, 89.6, 106.4, 116.3, 145.8, 154.3,
198.2, 199.1
Number of Member Organizations 6
Peers Per Ch 2
Total Peers 6
Number of Orderer Nodes
4 Kafka Nodes
3 Zookeeper Nodes
Number of Clients Per Ch 2
Total Clients 6
Number of Experiment Rounds 10
TX Send Rate reaches 106, the throughput waffles between 50 and 56 tps. We believe that such a result615
is induced by the small number of orderer nodes, which could not handle more than 200 tps. Likewise, the
latency in TX confirmation increases with the rise in TX Send Rate. Later, we also studied the correlation
between an increase in the number of peers and avg latency, and throughput respectively at varying TX
send rates (as shown in Figure-21a, b, and c). For this test, there were six clients, and the number of peers
varied from 6 to 24 in an increment of 6. It is observed that the throughput is mostly consistent with the620
send rate until the number of peers goes beyond 18. It can also be seen in Figure-21c that the throughput
decreases notably as the number of peers reaches 24. Similarly, the latency also increases with the increase
in the number of peers. Such a behavior can be attributed to the number of endorsing and orderer nodes
in the network that have to endorse and pack the TXs in the blocks and broadcast new blocks, respectively.
Moreover, it can also be accredited to the fact that for this experiment all the peers were run on a single625
machine in a constrained environment. Hence, once in distributed setting, each peer is expected to perform
much better. It is also believed that the TX throughput can be scaled by load balancing TX endorsement
across a pool of endorsers [49].
The experimental results uphold the idea of a multi-Ch blockchain network, as the same has demon-
strated more throughput and less latency than the one-Ch system. The network latency and throughput in630
Hyperledger-Fabric depend upon numerous factors, such as, application design, fabric network architecture,
specifications of endorsement policies, complexities of ACL rules, application/chaincode language, number
of endorsers and ordering nodes, the batch timeout, and the physical or the virtual network infrastructure
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Figure 18: Comparison of State validation, Block commit, and State commit avg time
[49]. Hence, a meticulously designed and laid out blockchain network and application can yield higher TX
throughput with less latency. E.g., FabCoin built on top of Hyperledger-Fabric can achieve a throughput of635
over 3560 tps with Kafka ordering service [50].
4.3. Limitations and Open Challenges
4.3.1. Multiple Ledger Storage by The Peers
The use of multiple data specific Chs is presumed to be scalable than a single Ch. However, since
committing peers have to maintain numerous ledgers, there may be a massive resource requirement for such640
nodes in a vast smart city network.
4.3.2. IoT Device Integrity
Electronic equipment, once connected to the internet is vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Resultantly, a hacker
can hack into the electronic device and install malware, or modify the software or hardware components to
alter the legitimate operation of the device [51, 52, 53]. Moreover, if an electronic device is physically com-645
promised, the attacker can also change the hardware components, i.e., extend device memory, increase RAM,
increase or decrease processor speed, change network configuration, activate or deactivate unauthorized ports
or interfaces (JTAG, UART etc), and change I/O (input/output) pins configuration [5, 54, 55]. Moreover, an
electronic device malfunction can be caused by an unintentional or unprovoked technical fault, hardware or
software failure, and a human error. Existing methods of device integrity check are based on code or memory650
attestation. These methods do not protect against physical compromise of the device, and modification of
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Figure 19: Comparison of Avg Latency and Avg Throughput in One-Ch and Three-Ch Scenario
Figure 20: a) Correlation between TX send rate and latency. b) Relation between TX send rate and network throughput
hardware or software components [4]. Contrarily, IoT data being the essential element to provide various
seamless services in a smart city environment necessitate that the device initially generating and processing
that data should be credible, i.e., only a legitimate and clean device should be able to input data to the
blockchain. Whereas, currently, there is no plausible mechanism to test the integrity of the IoT devices at655
run time.
4.4. A Way Forward to Address the Limitations
4.4.1. Alternative to Ledger Storage by the Peers
The concept of integrating edge computing into the mobile network architecture is not new [56]. There-
after, researchers are exploring the idea of using MEC (Mobile Edge Computing) as a gateway for IoT devices660
to achieve low latency, data aggregation, processing, and real-time application response [57, 58, 59]. The
deployment models of MEC range from SCC (Small Cell Cloud) [60, 61] to MMC (Mobile Micro Cloud) [62],
MobiScud (Fast Moving Personal Cloud) [63], FMC (Follow Me Cloud) and etc. In all these MEC concepts,
the first point of contact between the UE (User Equipment) and the mobile network is SCeNB (Small Cell
evolve NodeB) or eNB (evolve NodeB). However, depending upon the MEC architecture the computational665
and storage resources are located (can be in hardware or virtual form) at SCeNB/eNB for SCC and MCC,
and at distributed CN (Core Network) in the case of FMC. However, FMC with decentralized control and
distributed architecture is the preferred choice over SCC and MCC [64].
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Figure 21: Correlation between number of peers and network throughput at the send rate of (a) 5 tps, (b) 10 tps, and (c) 20 tps
Figure 22: Integration of Blockchain with MEC
We believe that based on the edge computing concept we can integrate blockchain with MEC to relieve
end nodes from maintaining many ledgers. In this context, the SCeNB/eNB or CN nodes (in case of FMC670
architecture) can be harnessed with a suitable blockchain platform to facilitate fast TX settlement and pro-
vision of swift data processing and analytics services. Moreover, the end nodes can send queries for data
(authorized to them) to the MEC nodes. To realize this concept, we propose a solution based on the FMC
model as shown in Figure-22. As of today, almost every inch of a populated area has cellular coverage, and
most of the latest IoT devices also support NB-IoT technology. NB-IoT is a sub LTE frequency band, and675
in the near future, all the telcos (telecommunications companies) will be able to provide NB-IoT services.
Moreover, the launch of 5G mobile network technology is also imminent. Hence, IoT devices can send sen-
sor data to the MEC nodes via NB-IoT/5G. The MEC nodes being resourceful in terms of infrastructure,
computational power, storage, and energy can also act as a blockchain committing peer. In this way, we
can utilize the existing infrastructure of MEC/cellular networks without incurring excessive costs. The MEC680
node can then communicate with the endorsing nodes/peers using backhaul network (5G, E1, T1, fiber op-
tics, satellite, etc.) and existing infrastructure at any distance. The inherent communication security of fiber
optics, NB-IoT [4], 4G, and 5G [65, 66] technology will also add another layer of security over the blockchain
P-2-P communication.
Turning a MEC node into a blockchain committing peer will be safe from the data security point of view,685
as the committing peers do not install and run the SCs. Hence, the SC TX logic will not be visible to
them. Moreover, to incentivize the cellular companies for their services, they can be paid some TX fee as a
reward in terms of the local digital token, e.g., PrivyCoin. Another advantage of integrating blockchain with
MEC model will be ease in mobility management (e.g., handover) of end nodes/user devices if they move
throughout the network.690
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4.4.2. Secure IoT Device Integration
The first element in IoT device security measures is device enrolment, in which only approved devices
should be allowed to communicate with the blockchain and call smart contract methods [21]. Secondly, all
the unnecessary ports on the device should be blocked such as JTAG and UART since any open port can be
used by an adversary to access the device and make malicious changes. Finally, most of the commercially695
available IoT devices such as wireless sensors, do not have a secure execution environment amid low costs.
Therefore, the device integrity check should frequently be performed to ensure its legitimacy.
5. Conclusions and Future Work
User data generated by today's smart devices ranging from smart watches to smart cars, smart homes,
auto-pay systems, ITS, etc., are vulnerable to privacy and security threats. Moreover, users also reserve the700
right to manage and control access to the data they own. Therefore, in this paper we introduced “PrivyShar-
ing”, an innovative blockchain-based secure and privacy-preserving data sharing mechanism for smart cities.
The proposed strategy ensures that personal/critical user data is kept confidential, securely processed and
is exposed to the stakeholders on the need to know basis as per user-defined ACL rules embedded in smart
contracts. Moreover, the data owners are rewarded for sharing their data with the stakeholders/third par-705
ties. PrivySharing also complies with some of the fundamental EU GDPR requirements, such as data asset
sharing, accessibility and purging with data owner's consent. In addition, the experimental results verified
that a multi-Ch blockchain solution scales better than a single Ch blockchain system.
Though we have presented all the details of the proposed network architecture and security mechanism,
however, as a PoC for this paper, we implemented a part of it. In the future, we aim to extend this work and710
incorporate the concept of the fog nodes based on existing mobile BTS stations and also devise a mechanism
for secure integration of IoT devices with the blockchain network.
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